![MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Robert Blakey: In this case, Plaintiff
attempted to join defendants it has already conceded may not properly be joined in one
suit, see [26] at 1−2 (indicating that Plaintiff sued the named defendants in a prior case
before Judge Pacold, but then voluntarily dismissed them when Judge Pacold challenged
joinder). Although joinder decisions may involve some measure of discretion, repeatedly
naming the exact same group or subgroup of defendants in new cases until a case is
assigned to a judge the Plaintiff believes to be hospitable to Plaintiff's own theory of
joinder constitutes a willful abuse of the judicial process. If Plaintiff had a good faith
factual and legal basis to join these defendants, it could have pressed its position in the
prior case (and appealed in due course if appropriate), but it declined to do so. Instead,
when challenged, Plaintiff cut and ran, then filed a new suit, seeking to join the same
parties based upon the same allegations. That strategy not only constitutes an egregious
form of forum shopping, it also consumes scarce judicial resources, as Plaintiff asks judge
after judge to make the same exact determination, hoping for a more favorable outcome.
Based upon Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process, the Court dismisses this case with
prejudice. See, e.g., Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) ("District courts
'possess certain inherent powers, not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. That authority
includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the
judicial process.' "); Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir.
2009) ("Sanctions meted out pursuant to the court's inherent power are appropriate where
the offender has willfully abused the judicial process or otherw…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:hvwhptk4oerwsuzau66ikwfy/bafkreidmmyxnu27goixed5lqiscsfgvwzuxb3xwkyaamrgwrvx5erc6qja)
MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Robert Blakey: In this case, Plaintiff
attempted to join defendants it has already conceded may not properly be joined in one
suit, see [26] at 1−2 (indicating that Plaintiff sued the named defendants in a prior case
before Judge Pacold, but then voluntarily dismissed them when Judge Pacold challenged
joinder). Although joinder decisions may involve some measure of discretion, repeatedly
naming the exact same group or subgroup of defendants in new cases until a case is
assigned to a judge the Plaintiff believes to be hospitable to Plaintiff's own theory of
joinder constitutes a willful abuse of the judicial process. If Plaintiff had a good faith
factual and legal basis to join these defendants, it could have pressed its position in the
prior case (and appealed in due course if appropriate), but it declined to do so. Instead,
when challenged, Plaintiff cut and ran, then filed a new suit, seeking to join the same
parties based upon the same allegations. That strategy not only constitutes an egregious
form of forum shopping, it also consumes scarce judicial resources, as Plaintiff asks judge
after judge to make the same exact determination, hoping for a more favorable outcome.
Based upon Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process, the Court dismisses this case with
prejudice. See, e.g., Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) ("District courts
'possess certain inherent powers, not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. That authority
includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the
judicial process.' "); Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir.
2009) ("Sanctions meted out pursuant to the court's inherent power are appropriate where
the offender has willfully abused the judicial process or otherw…
Judge Blakey dismisses another #ScheduleA cases for defendant pinching.
Sigmaxgo LLC v. SCHEDULE A, No. 1:26-cv-00132 (N.D. Ill.), ECF 27
![MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin: Telephone status
hearing held on 3/4/2026. For the reasons stated on the record, Defendant
jiujiangshengyixi's motion to vacate default judgment order [39] is granted. Plaintiff's
motion to enforce settlement or stay Defendant's motion [44] is denied as moot. Mailed
notice. (ecw, )](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:hvwhptk4oerwsuzau66ikwfy/bafkreie324wbvttocj5lo4bmghldffzadkmaieg7snqnl6exgede7trxfy)
![In other cases, courts have decreased profit awards based on equity when a separate award
of defendant’s profits unjustly enriches the plaintiff, excessively punishes the defendant, or there
Case: 1:22-cv-05936 Document #: 67 Filed: 04/01/26 Page 6 of 18 PageID #:2124
6
is a lack of sufficient evidence linking the defendant’s profits to the infringement. See, e.g.,
Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-Tecsys Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5238, at *42-44 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
23, 2000) (reducing award of damages from $4 million to $2.37 million where there was also a
lost profits award, and wrongful profits award was equivalent of company’s total sales); Stuart v.
Collins, 489 F. Supp. 827, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reducing award of defendant’s profits from
$350,000 to $200,000 where the original amount represented substantially more than plaintiff had
ever earned and defendant’s conduct, while willful, was not in bad faith or an intentional attempt
to trade off plaintiff’s goodwill); Lurzer GMBH v. Am. Showcase, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (court exercised its discretion to reduce the profits award by half to $326,405.50
where, in part, “the slim evidence that Klik! sales resulted from use of the ‘Archive’ name suggests
that awarding a full accounting [is] unwarranted.”). There is no separate award in this case](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:hvwhptk4oerwsuzau66ikwfy/bafkreibvqsofrzal4m545sopaocp4it56wxbcra3vbtq5gqwquz2xmoyki)
![MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso: Telephonic motion hearing
held. Plaintiffs' Motion for entry of a preliminary injunction [34] is granted. Enter
Preliminary injunction order. The Clerk's office is directed to unseal all previously sealed
documents. Plaintiff is ordered to add all Defendant names listed in the Schedule A to the
docket within three business days. Instructions can be found on the court's website at
www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Plaintiff moves [41] to strike on the basis that Defendant Yuan
Yuanjie's motion [39] cites non−existent cases, likely generated by an artificial
intelligence platform. The Court had reviewed Defendant's motion which cites, for
example "NSI Int'l, Inc. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on
Schedule A, Case No. 1:24−cv−05560 (N.D. Ill. 2024)." Though the case number exists,
the case number identifies a different case unrelated to Defendant's motion. Because
Defendant has cited non−existent cases, Plaintiff's motion [41] to strike is granted and
Defendant's motion [39] is stricken. Presentment of motion set for 3/17/26 is stricken.
Telephonic status hearing set for 4/14/26 at 9:30 a.m. Members of the public and media
will be able to call in to listen to this hearing. The call−in number is 650−479−3207 and
the access code is 1804010308. Persons granted remote access to proceedings are
reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting
of court proceedings. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions, including
removal of court issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of
entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. Notice
mailed by Judge's staff (lf, )](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:hvwhptk4oerwsuzau66ikwfy/bafkreihtc37ktm7vzqyomv5eq5blzlibqmy6izkfjmzc63eg6kjpuz4ozy)
