#topic

@tmlr-pub.bsky.social

1 day ago

New #Featured Certification:

PRISM: PRIor from corpus Statistics for topic Modeling

Tal Ishon, Yoav Goldberg, Uri Shaham

https://openreview.net/forum?id=454v3Xbtza

#corpus #semantic #topic

0 0 0 0

@aisfriesland.bsky.social

2 days ago

VesselAlert
Name: TOPIC
MMSI: 244391008
Callsign: PF5949
Type: Pleasure Craft
Flag: Netherlands
Seen: 06-Apr-2026 07:22:07 CEST
Speed: 0.0 kts
Distance: 13.3 nm
Signal RSSI: -18.0 dBFS
Ship AIS VesselAlert © kx1t - link

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@aisfriesland.bsky.social

3 days ago

VesselAlert
Name: TOPIC
MMSI: 244391008
Type: Pleasure Craft
Flag: Netherlands
Seen: 05-Apr-2026 12:18:47 CEST
Speed: 0.0 kts
Distance: 13.3 nm
Signal RSSI: 0.0 dBFS
Ship AIS VesselAlert © kx1t - link

0 0 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

6 days ago

Bridging the Gap between Engineering and Network Security (OT-IT) – a Cultural Chasm On April 1, 2026, Dr. Darrell Eilts, CIO of the Sewage and Water Board of New Orleans, and I will be guests on the Grid Podcast. This discussion will not focus on IT/OT convergence. Instead, we will address a more fundamental issue: the need for true collaboration between engineering and network security. Network impacts are data failures whereas control system impacts (whether unintentional or malicious) result in physical impacts. Engineering/network security collaboration is not simply an extension of IT/OT convergence – it is a clash of cultures. It is reflected in professional engagement as well as relatively few engineers attend cybersecurity conferences, and relatively few cybersecurity professionals attend engineering conferences. On the podcast, Darrell and I will discuss issues we identified in our upcoming paper, “Packets and Process: What Network Security and Engineering Get Wrong About Each Other,” to be published in the June 2026 issue of IEEE Computer magazine. Darrell will outline why network security professionals often struggle to engage with engineering, while I will address why engineers are often reluctant to work with network security. The bottom line is straightforward: no infrastructure can be truly cyber secure when the culture is broken. Without effective collaboration between engineering and network security, gaps will persist. The podcast can be found at https://www.youtube.com/@thegridpodcast777 and the tape will be available on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/live/IwjBQIH6zaM?si=wtocJoE15I9u7U0p. We hope you will join us and bring your questions to the discussion. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55367315/how-to-close-the-cultural-gap-between-engineering-and-network-security Post Views: 13

Bridging the Gap between Engineering and Network Security (OT-IT) – a Cultural Chasm On April 1, 2026, Dr. Darrell Eilts, CIO of the Sewage and Water Board of New Orleans, and I will be guests on...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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🖤 Spiritually Speaking 💙

@spiritspeaks.bsky.social

6 days ago

Wilayat vs Imamat: Asal Haqeeqat Kya Hai? | Younus AlGohar | ALRA TV YouTube video by ALRA TV

Wilayat vs Imamat: Asal Haqeeqat Kya Hai? | Younus AlGohar ALRATV youtu.be/Xd6431eUyl8?... via @YouTube #Quran #Sunnah #Hadith #HadithOfTheDay #Hadiths #foryou #ImamMehdi #Imam #Difference #Topic #Speech #Lecture #fyp #fypシ゚viral #foryourpage #Sufism #SpiritualEnergy #viralreels #knowledgeIsPower

0 0 0 0

Topoin

@topoin.bsky.social

1 week ago

Apa Itu Furab? Arti Istilah Viral Fuji dan Reza Arap yang Ramai di Media Sosial Aopok.com - #Belakangan #ini, #media #sosial #diramaikan #dengan #istilah “#Furab” #yang #viral #dan #menjadi #trending #topic di #berbagai platform seperti TikTok, X (Twitter), hingga Instagram. Banyak netizen penasaran mengenai arti Furab dan asal-usul kemunculannya. Lalu, apa itu Furab sebenarnya? Baca juga: Video Call Viral Suami Clara Shinta dengan Wanita Lain diburu Netizen Apa Itu Furab? Arti Istilah Viral Fuji dan Reza Arap yang Ramai di Media Sosial Arti Furab yang Viral di Media Sosial Istilah “Furab” merupakan singkatan atau gabungan nama dari dua figur publik populer, yaitu Fuji dan Reza Arap.

Apa Itu Furab? Arti Istilah Viral Fuji dan Reza Arap yang Ramai di Media Sosial

Aopok.com - #Belakangan #ini, #media #sosial #diramaikan #dengan #istilah “#Furab” #yang #viral #dan #menjadi #trending #topic di #berbagai platform seperti TikTok, X (Twitter), hingga Instagram. Banyak netizen…

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2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 week ago

Awakari App

Impressions of the 70-page Cyber Resilience Act Draft Guidance I have shared my impressions of the CRA before in writing[1] and was surprised to hear that a Draft Guide for the CRA was issued for c...

#General #Topic

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🖤 Spiritually Speaking 💙

@spiritspeaks.bsky.social

1 week ago

Maut aur Ghaibat Mein Farq | Younus AlGohar | ALRA TV YouTube video by ALRA TV

Maut aur Ghaibat Mein Farq | Younus AlGohar | ALRA TV youtu.be/PRNhy2FMsPA?... via @YouTube #Question #Answer #Session #Topic #Quran #Sunnah #HadithOfTheDay #Hadiths #Sufism #Tasawwuf #Sufis #Important #Discussion #fypシ゚ #viralvídeo #Urdu #Lectures #Speech #Knowledge #Teachings #viralreels #reeks

0 0 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 week ago

Weiss to give presentation on process sensor cybersecurity on 7-May May 7, 2026, I will be speaking on process sensor cybersecurity at Sensors Converge in Santa Clara, CA ((https://www.sensorsconverge.com/). Process sensor cybersecurity is an important, but poorly understood topic. Most cybersecurity conferences do not address it because process sensors are viewed as engineering devices rather than cyber assets. This gap was evident at the 2026 RSA Conference, where process sensor cybersecurity was not discussed. Many OT security organizations implicitly assume that process sensors are uncompromised, authenticated, and providing correct data. In practice, that assumption is often incorrect. There is also a belief that existing OT cybersecurity training covers process sensor issues. It does not. At the same time, sensor and engineering conferences generally exclude cybersecurity considerations. As a result, process sensor cybersecurity falls outside the scope of multiple industries including electric power, water, pipelines, and transportation. This is not a theoretical concern. Both unintentional failures and malicious cyber incidents involving process sensors have led to catastrophic outcomes, including equipment damage, loss of life, and, in at least one case, bankruptcy. The lack of attention to process sensor cybersecurity may also create unintended challenges for compliance with regulations such as the European Cyber Resilience Act. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55366696/sensors-converge-2026-what-will-be-discussed Post Views: 46

Weiss to give presentation on process sensor cybersecurity on 7-May May 7, 2026, I will be speaking on process sensor cybersecurity at Sensors Converge in Santa Clara, CA ((https://www.sensorsconve

#General #Topic

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Chris (JamrockChris88-Gaming)

@creativechris88.bsky.social

1 week ago

Take up space. You deserve to be seen & heard. You matter. 💛

#thoughts #bluesky #relationships #topic

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Allison Moon 🌙 🍁

@shewandersferal.bsky.social

1 week ago

What if Iran wins? #duet #war #iran #trump #israel #restructuring #oil #military #straitofhormuz YouTube video by Hawk's Podcasts / mdg650hawk

#BRiCS is laughing

They managed to crack #MuricunHegemony, #MuricunExceptionalism & the #PetroDollar for the #PetroYuan in one fucking year…
Sadly, I have been warning people but nobody listens to #ThisCanadian or any of the #topic #knowledgeable #Women she cites…

🤷🏻‍♀️

0 0 0 0

Nicola Woodford-Smith

@nicmaths.bsky.social

2 weeks ago

👀 Look at #AQAs #FREE #resources for #GCSE #Maths exam #intervention & preparation.

In the lead up to the first exam, we have short & long versions of #topic tests for #students to improve their confidence & success as part of their #revision

www.aqa.org.uk/all-about-ma...

0 0 0 0

Stormzulien's Test Bot

@stormbot.bsky.social

2 weeks ago

What's up? #topic

0 0 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

3 weeks ago

How bad was it this time? New proposal appears for better incident evaluation and reporting – without the inflation. Slide used at my lecture on Operational Energy and Cybersecurity at Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia to an audience of Defence ministry civilians and military participants. The bullet points come from reading official reports (published a month later) on the 29 December 2025 cyber attack on Polish power grid. Making a judgement on an incident takes time and the participation of people closest to what happened. In following the various ICS cyber incidents since 2010 I often asked myself: how significant is this incident for the sector of critical infrastructure in which it occurred? Was it an incident due to some unintentional accident, operator error, equipment fault or was malicious intent involved? Then I try to get a reading on the skill level of the attacker(s) and then think about motive. Was it financial gain, pranksterism, or something more sinister. In addition, I try to place the event in context of the current security environment and estimate what it means for industry. The media (consisting of journalists and non-engineers) is helpful in first bringing the event to our attention. However, it is hard to come to any useful conclusion in the absence of an official report on what, who, where, how and why something happened. I have often asked my engineering colleagues for their take on what happened and any lessons learned. This sharing of views is most helpful but still not enough sometimes to decide on whether this is a one-off incident, not likely to be repeated soon, or whether it is part of a new trend to be concerned about and prepare for. Recently an industry opinion leader who organizes a well-attended annual ICS security conference, announced a new initiative, The OT Incident Impact Score, to try to take away the counterproductive media’s spin on an event[1]. I believe that he and his colleagues participating in the initiative will try to inject some industry savvy evaluation of what happened before the media bubble has a chance to distort and/or amplify the story. Perhaps even help to avoid counterproductive outcomes such as holding unnecessary government hearings. I read Mr. Peterson’s brief announcement and description of the proposal and while he adds a caveat that it is “not a metric for the OT security community”, I see some challenges to overcome for this initiative to be something useful for the community he refers to. First, in my opinion, the brief places a less than favorable characterization on the engineers working hard to keep critical infrastructure up and running by implying that they are the cause (“… from us, the OT security community”) of the less than useful media announcements on incidents. Certainly a better illustrative example could have been chosen than a swimming pool or water tank incident to make the point[2]. Regarding serious ICS incidents, in most cases, the engineers and crews are working hard to address the problem and bring things back to normal. These announcements to the press that are referred to tend to come from members of the C-Suite, government officials, their public relations people or security solution salesmen. Those that are farther from where things happened and likely to be initially less informed about the process affected. That IMO is what is wrong, and what Mr. Peterson’s proposal will try to address. Now for the challenges in implementing this interesting proposal. **Challenge number one** comes from the time frame to provide information to the public “in 12 hours or sooner of the incident being reported”[3]. I believe this exposes a weakness in the value of the scoring provided in such short time. The main issue is that in most announced incidents via the media the first reports tend to be inaccurate. One example is the San Bruno Pipeline Explosion (2010) which news sites for several hours reported the cause to be from a fire, gas station explosion and even a plane crash[4]. Getting the facts about what happened in the first moments after an incident is complicated by many factors of uncertainty from lack of confirmed information, time pressure to announce something, and other “fog of war” type factors. **The next challenge** for scoring is the lack of forensics which requires not only some time but available expertise on-site. A good example of this is the time it took (several months) for operators of that Saudi Arabian refinery during the Triton/Trisis/Hatman incident for them to understand that malicious intent was behind SIS caused unplanned plant shutdowns in the summer of 2017. The operators were initially led to believe that their SIS was ok after diagnostics were performed by the manufacturer after the first shutdown. It was only after the second shutdown and after a consultant from the outside was brought in that they learned of the cyber-attack on their critical safety and control systems. This incident was a topic of great interest at one of the S4 conferences.[5] **Sadly, without forensic investigations and availability of a published report the scoring can be considered as educated opinions or guesses at best**. **The last challenge** insuring that the scoring of an incident is based on objective facts. In lieu of a forensic investigation and publication of an official report the only source of information about an incident that can be reliably trusted while the investigation is underway and while the report is being written is from the engineers who encountered and are addressing what happened. Asking questions to on-site responders shortly after an incident or one that still not under control would be problematic. These responders are likely to be fully engaged in the heat of the moment, under stress, and possibly trying to keep their minds free for what to tell the bosses, media and legal department. **Then there are membership concerns.** The requirements for becoming a member of this scoring group meant to improve evaluation of incidents seem low – “OT professionals who are minimally vetted. (Are they a real person and are they involved in OT”). I suspect that extra vetting points will be automatically added if the candidate has attended the S4 conferences. Otherwise, one has reason to seriously wonder about the worth of the incident scoring. As a former co-chair of ISA 99 Workgroup 16 on Incident Management, we realized the importance of tapping into the knowledge of control system professionals with experience in managing ICS incidents[6]. The best candidates for becoming members of this select group of incident scorers would be people who have an engineering background and direct experience with incident management. Better to get this information from those who were involved in the incident. Their knowledge of the system and what happened to what would surely provide a sounder basis for any judgement about scoring. Alas, for various reasons such as confidentiality issues this kind of information is not likely to be available inside of 12 hours. One word of advice: make sure there is a mix of views. It would not be a good thing if this ended up as a platform for cyber incident skeptics to prosper. While the major incidents that we know of that involve state actors are few, that does not mean the lessons of Stuxnet are not being studied and learned from. IMO the best source for objective judgement on the severity of an incident which can be scored with some confidence are official reports published not hours but months after an investigation. Two most recent examples are several reports and analyses on the Iberian blackout and cyber-attack on the Polish grid in April[7] and December[8] 2025 respectively. After reading these reports that have some input from those who participated in managing the incident are one of the most valuable sources to support one’s judgement in assigning a severity score. The scorers will have to deal with a headline/deadline driven media that may not wait a month before reporting on a story. However, if the media and scorers could wait for more solid information, both would surely provide better information to the public and especially to policy makers. It is too much perhaps to ask that the scoring group perform one more service besides. I would recommend adding some further analysis and provide a heads up for all those “involved with OT”. For example, using the two incidents referred to above. One can say something about whether the incidents involving DER in both cases represent some trend or whether they show similarities and patterns with previous incidents. Perhaps a little added analysis and recommendations based on lessons learned provided by these incidents can also be made by this select group? The risk is that poor information even with this noble initiative will continue to feed poorly informed and incident inflation centric media. My 11-euro cents adjusted for inflation and higher shipping costs. * * * [1] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/reducing-ot-incident-impact-inflation-dale-peterson-uy3xc/ [2] It is amazing since the publication of the 2023 US Cybersecurity Strategy to see the use of such trivial examples as the use of baby monitors. In this proposal we have swimming pools where many readers are perhaps looking more for something more relevant to a nation’s critical infrastructure. [3] Ibid. [4] Read the NTSB report https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/par1101.pdf [5] Watch Julian Gutmanis describe his “first responder’ experience at S4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwSJ8hloGvY [6] Please note my use of the term “ICS” instead of the media friendly “OT”. I never liked the use of the term OT in describing incidents such as Stuxnet or most recently the cyber-attack on RTU’s in Poland on 29 December 2025. ICS, AIS, IACS as is used in ISA/IEC 62443 say more about the environment and the devices concerned than what is more about the control room where processes are mostly watched rather than controlled. [7] Published 28 July 2025 3 months after the incident https://aelec.es/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/20250730_CL_INESCTEC_Blackout_full-report_en.pdf or look at the Spanish operator’s REE report issued over a month later https://d1n1o4zeyfu21r.cloudfront.net/WEB_Incident_%2028A_SpanishPeninsularElectricalSystem_18june25.pdf or watch the NERC briefing on the incident https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZbOnNnl15M [8] Published by CERT Polska on 30 January 2026, one month after the incident https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/ Or look at Drago’s report issued about the same time, https://www.dragos.com/blog/poland-power-grid-attack-electrum-targets-distributed-energy-2025 Post Views: 134

How bad was it this time? New proposal appears for better incident evaluation and reporting – without the inflation. In following the various ICS cyber incidents since 2010 I often asked myself: ...

#General #Topic

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StarWars

@starwars.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

3 weeks ago

Ryan Clark blasts ’embarrassing’ Trump White House NFL-style war video Among those who were not happy with President Donald Trump’s NFL-style war video amid the Iran conflict is former Pro Bo...

#Celebrity #NFL #NFL #Stories #Donald #Trump #Ryan #Clark #Serious #Topic

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Stormzulien's Test Bot

@stormbot.bsky.social

4 weeks ago

Image Source: Lorem Picsum (No alt text - sorry.)

While Donald Duck is pulling, Conor McGregor has already always jumped the step, alongside Carly Simon. #topic

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Edgewood Studios

@edgewoodstudios.bsky.social

1 month ago

Something I made a while ago in ChatGpt. Debate Theatre, anyone debating any topic and it generates some of the funniest shit I've seen in my life. Enjoy.
#chatgpt #ai #ronaldreagan #debate #ideas #topic #stage #cash #credit #laugh #funny #callofduty #lol #lmao #bluesky #fyp #foryoupage #mario

0 1 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying and addressing cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report, the Dragos 2025 Report, and the OT I Impact Score are typical of OT cyber incident reporting that equate data breaches and ransomware with cyber incidents. Industry and government network security organizations cannot continue to ignore control system cyber incidents because the incidents don’t meet their narrow definition – this is a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue. Network and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate controls ystem cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue not only to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges, but will also leave our critical infrastructures dangerously cyber vulnerable. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360902/ot-cybersecurity-is-a-governance-failure-masquerading-as-a-vocabulary-issue Post Views: 22

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system or...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

1 month ago

ネット上の付き合い｜ポイズン雷花 ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。偽る、成りすますのはごく簡単。友情、愛情、仲間意識。これらは幻想、或いは勘違いに過ぎん。都合の良い時だけ付き合う、話し掛けて来る。僅かでも都合が悪く成れば簡単に崩壊する、簡単に切り捨てられる。曖昧で脆い関係、情を持つのは愚かしく、自滅を招きかねない。僅かでも興味な...

ネット上の付き合い
ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。
何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。

note.com/poison_raika...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest #block

1 1 0 0

ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

1 month ago

Віртуальні стосунки｜ポイズン雷花 Онлайн-стосунки дуже ризиковані та нестабільні. Я не знаю, хто вони і звідки, я не знаю їхніх імен чи облич. Навіть якщо ви думаєте, що розумієте це, це не викликає довіри. Дуже легко збрехати чи вида...

Віртуальні стосунки
Онлайн-стосунки дуже ризиковані та нестабільні.

note.com/poison_raika...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest #block #kick

0 1 0 0

Stormzulien's Test Bot

@stormbot.bsky.social

1 month ago

The modern wolfish yo mama scared over the defiant, wistful human. #topic

0 0 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report is typical of reporting organizations that equate cyber incidents to data breaches. Control system cyber incidents include field device communication issues, automation malfunctions, loss-of-view, loss-of-control, and are not confined to confirmed attacks. Some of these incidents have led to injuries and deaths. Network security and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate control system cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360358/control-system-cyber-incidents-are-not-the-same-as-network-breaches Post Views: 21

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and crite...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

0 0 0 0

ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

1 month ago

#online #dangerous ネット上の付き合い - ポイズン雷花の小説 - pixiv ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。偽る、成りすますのはごく簡単。友情、愛情、仲間意識。これらは幻想、或いは勘違いに過ぎん。都合の良い時だけ付き合う、話し掛けて来る。僅かでも都合が悪

ネット上の付き合い
ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。
何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。

www.pixiv.net/novel/show.p...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest

0 1 0 0

2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and attack vectors have been known since 2010 (Stuxnet), the attacker has been known since 2015 (GRU first Ukraine attack December 2015 and again in 2016), Alerts, reports, books have been released about these attacks (CISA, Dragos, Govts, Kim Zetter, Andy Greenberg, etc.) and best practices have been available for decades (PERA, ISA 62443, 95, 88), yet the victim used default configurations with some available security settings not enabled! Not the best security choice to make when it is believed that the responsible suspect nation is engaged in a brutal aggression across the border. One more question raised is what is wrong with the distribution and acceptance of lessons learned? This incident was, according to the publicly available information[1], made possible by the attacker simply reaching for the “low hanging fruit” on the victim’s control infrastructure. Is it because the victim is afraid to change anything (removing defaults, enabling something after production starts (if so, what was the system integrator thinking about)? Is it a sign that the operator lacks sufficient knowledge of their systems and operation? Training is certainly available that can address the low hanging fruit issue. Or is it cybergs again i.e… “Things are just fine, no need to send anyone to training, and no need to change what we are used to doing”? I resist saying this incident is another “wake up call”. IMO there have been sufficient alarms not just in this recent case but since 2010. N.B. One of thew definitions of “cyberg” is applied in discussing this incident: “A cyber-related condition whereby a threat, or warning of a possible threat, results in either the misinterpretation or misunderstanding of a given situation, resulting in a decision in which no corrective action is taken” – quote (attributed to yours truly and other definitions available on the cyberg website //cyberg.us (special thanks to Rad Radvanovsky) Link to CERT POLSKA report referred to in this article: https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 . * * * [1] https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 Post Views: 46

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and a...

#General #Topic

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2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and attack vectors have been known since 2010 (Stuxnet), the attacker has been known since 2015 (GRU first Ukraine attack December 2015 and again in 2016), Alerts, reports, books have been released about these attacks (CISA, Dragos, Govts, Kim Zetter, Andy Greenberg, etc.) and best practices have been available for decades (PERA, ISA 62443, 95, 88), yet the victim used default configurations with some available security settings not enabled! Not the best security choice to make when it is believed that the responsible suspect nation is engaged in a brutal aggression across the border. One more question raised is what is wrong with the distribution and acceptance of lessons learned? This incident was, according to the publicly available information[1], made possible by the attacker simply reaching for the “low hanging fruit” on the victim’s control infrastructure. Is it because the victim is afraid to change anything (removing defaults, enabling something after production starts (if so, what was the system integrator thinking about)? Is it a sign that the operator lacks sufficient knowledge of their systems and operation? Training is certainly available that can address the low hanging fruit issue. Or is it cybergs again i.e… “Things are just fine, no need to send anyone to training, and no need to change what we are used to doing”? I resist saying this incident is another “wake up call”. IMO there have been sufficient alarms not just in this recent case but since 2010. N.B. One of thew definitions of “cyberg” is applied in discussing this incident: “A cyber-related condition whereby a threat, or warning of a possible threat, results in either the misinterpretation or misunderstanding of a given situation, resulting in a decision in which no corrective action is taken” – quote (attributed to yours truly and other definitions available on the cyberg website //cyberg.us (special thanks to Rad Radvanovsky) Link to CERT POLSKA report referred to in this article: https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 . * * * [1] https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 Post Views: 46

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and a...

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Melanie Borges Martins

@melanieborges.bsky.social

1 month ago

#Write your #Story.
The #topic is
#Maximum #Empathy

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WIST Quotations

@wistquotes.friendica.world.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Original post on friendica.world

A quotation from **Samuel Johnson**

> It is commonly observed, that when two Englishmen meet, their first talk is of the weather; they are in haste to tell each other, what each must already know, that it is hot or cold, bright or cloudy, windy or calm.

**Samuel Johnson** (1709-1784) English […]

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CyberTaters

@potato.software

1 month ago

Why do potatosecurity organizations refuse to identify control system potato incidents Potatosecurity policies require that potato incidents be identified as such. Potato incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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2rZiKKbOU3nTafniR2qMMSE0gwZ

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are then initiated after incidents are identified as being cyber-related. To meet those goals, training is required to be able to identify control system incidents as being cyber-related and a mechanism to disseminate this information on control system cyber incidents throughout the organization as well as to relevant outside entities. Control system cyber incidents affect physics and therefore there are often physical reactions. That is trains crash,planes crash, lights go out, water supply is compromised, pipelines burst,robots “misbehave”, etc. You can’t hide the impacts, but people often can’t (or won’t) identify the incidents as being cyber-related. US government reports from NTSB, NRC, DOE, EPA, TSA, FDA, etc.have not identified many control system incidents as being cyber-related nor have many international government organizations either. Neither have industry organizations such as NERC. Government and industry cyber information sharing programs are about vulnerabilities not consequences. A concern about control system cyber incident disclosure was identified after 9/11 – connecting the dots. This is made more difficult with the silos between sectors and federal law enforcement withholding information that a cyber incident has occurred until an indictment is issued which can be a year or more. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55356232/cybersecurity-organizations-must-identify-control-system-cyber-incidents Post Views: 8

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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Posts tagged #topic