The Argument
In its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many appli- cations of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on acomputer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior of these systems. In many instances, these computer simula- tions are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of trans- formation has its own epistemology.
Theory + General Physical Modeling Assumptions
↓
Mechanical Model+Parameters, Boundary Values, Initial Data
↓
Dynamical Model+Ad hoc Modeling Assumptions, Approximations, Reduction of Degrees of Freedom
↓
Discretization, Coding
↓
Computational Model+Imaging Techniques, Data Analysis, Interpretation
↓
Model of the Phenomena
Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation by Eric Winsberg
www.winsberg.net/uploads/7/4/...
#philosophyofscience #philscience #metascience